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DUE PROCESS METHODOLOGY IN PARENTAL
TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS-SANTOSKY V. KRAMER
Traditionally, parents have been accorded the right' to control the
upbringing2 of their children. Although this right is not explicitly granted
in the United States Constitution,3 the Supreme Court has established that
parents have a constitutionally protected interest in the establishment4 and
1. The origin of parental-rights remains uncertain despite considerable comment. One
theory holds that parental rights gained recognition as a property right, with the child analogized
to a chattel. For a discussion of this theory, see SCHOULEC, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 243-49 (5th ed. 1895); Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U.
CHI. L. REV. 672 (1942). Another theory suggests that parental rights derived from the
trust reposed in parents by the state pursuant to its authority as parens patriae. This trust
theory serves to justify the state's power to intervene in the parent-child relationship when
the child is in need of care. See Comment, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FoR-
DHAM L. REV. 669 (1976) (likening the parent-child relationship to a trust). For a discussion
of the early development of the parental rights concept, see generally Tamilia, Neglect Pro-
ceedings and the Conflict Between Law and Social Work, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 579-81 (1971) (pre-20th
century courts reluctant to interfere with the sanctity of the family).
2. The current rights of parents include the right to establish a home and rear a child,
to maintain the care, custody, society, and association of the child, to control the child's educa-
tion, to choose the child's religion, to veto the issuance of a passport to the child, to ad-
minister the child's property, to discipline the child, to choose medical care for the child, to
give the child a name, to consent to the child's marriage, to determine the child's nationality
and domicile and to consent to the child's adoption. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental
Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 410, 413 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dobson]; Levy, The Rights of Parents,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 698. Parental rights are not, however, unlimited. See also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents exempt from compulsory school attendance law
requiring them to send their children to public or private school until age 16); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state prohibited from requiring children to accept instruction
only from public school teachers).
3. The states, rather than the federal government, have traditionally assumed the respon-
sibility for regulating family and domestic relations. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,
352 (1966) (Court scrupulously refrained from interfering with state solutions to domestic rela-
tions problems); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (state procedures will not be
interfered with unless they violate fundamental rights); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348,
350 (lst Cir. 1974) (federal courts reluctant to interfere with state authority over family and
matrimonial matters). See generally Caplow, The Loco Parent: Federal Policy and Family Life,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 710 (federal government should not interfere with traditional family
relations).
4. The Supreme Court has given constitutional protection to the establishment of the family.
The Court has declared that the right to marry is fundamental. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating statute which prohibited residents from marrying if delin-
quent in child support payments); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(fourteenth amendment liberty right encompasses decisions relating to marriage, thus, man-
datory maternity leave requirement unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(Court held right to marry is fundamental in our society and overturned a statute that pro-
hibited interracial marriages).
The Court also has established the right to procreate as one of the "basic civil rights of
man." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (overturning Oklahoma's criminal steriliza-
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maintenance5 of their family life. This parental freedom of choice in family
matters is protected under two basic analyses: the zone of privacy created
by the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments; 6 and the fourteenth amend-
tion statute which forced sterilization of habitual criminals). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965), the Court struck down a statute which prohibited the use of contracep-
tives by married couples. The majority viewed this right as legitimate and protected by a zone
of privacy found in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id. at 484-85. Justice
Goldberg, in his concurrence, found recognition for this protected right under a different analysis.
Justice Goldberg stated that the due process clause protects liberties that are "so rooted in
the traditions and consciences of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 497
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Aynder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
He concluded that the right to marital privacy is a "fundamental and basic" right retained
by the people within the meaning of the ninth amendment. 381 U.S. at 499. Also included
within the majority's zone of privacy is the decision whether to bear a child or terminate a
pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Roe Court held, however, that after
the first trimester, the state's interest in protecting both the mother from the significant health
risks created by the abortion and the fetal life becomes compelling. Consequently, absent a
health risk in the mother carrying the child to term, these concerns outweigh the mother's
privacy right. Id. at 163.
Some areas of family life have not been protected. One area involves the rights of foster
parents. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977), the Court re-
fused to hold that foster parents have a protected liberty interest in their foster children. The
Smith Court found that the procedures provided by the state were adequate to protect the
limited liberty interests of the foster parents. Another area which remains unsettled is the parental
rights of unwed fathers. Compare Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (natural father
who never had legal or actual custody of his eleven year old child denied authority to veto
adoption of the child) with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 657-58 (1972) (state pro-
hibited from taking custody of unwed father's children without a hearing and a finding that
the father was an unfit parent).
5. The Court has protected rights incident to the establishment of family life. In the seminal
case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court established that a state
may not interfere with the fundamental right of parents to control the education of their children
and, thus, struck down a statute banning the teaching of foreign languages in school. Id. at
403. The Meyer doctrine was reaffirmed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
The Court in Pierce struck down a statute imposing compulsory public school attendance. The
Court held that it "unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 534-35. More recently,
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that the Amish parents' claims
of first amendment religious freedom and fourteenth amdndment due process freedom were
sufficient to overturn a criminal statute mandating school attendance. The Yoder Court recognized
that parents possess the primary role in raising their children. See id. at 232. The Court also
has upheld the family's choice of living arrangements. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977), a woman was arrested and convicted for living with her son and two
grandsons in violation of a city ordinance which banned statutorily defined "non-families"
from living together. The Moore Court struck down the statute holding that it infringed upon
the parents' right of personal choice on matters of marriage and family life. Id. at 499.
Although protected, parental rights have been subordinated to both the child's rights and
the state's interest in protecting minors. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979)
(despite recognition of parental rights against undue, adverse interference by state, minor not
required to obtain parent's consent for abortion because of unique nature of decision); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 170 (1941) (although guardian's right to care and nurture
child is cardinal, state has a compelling interest in prohibiting minors from preaching religious
interests in public streets even if accompanied by parent or guardian).
6. In Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973), the Supreme Court stated
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ment guarantee of due process.7 Employing these analyses, the Court has
declared that freedom of choice in family matters is an essential right, even
more precious than property rights.8 Consequently, the Court has repeatedly
struck down statutes which arbitrarily infringe upon a parent's protected
interest.9
Despite the constitutional protections parents enjoy over matters of family
autonomy, certain compelling situations warrant state infringement of the
family unit.' 0 There are basically two theories that justify this intervention
that the right to privacy "encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Other Supreme Court deci-
sions have recognized a zone of privacy in domestic matters. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154, 163 (1973) (decision on whether to terminate pregnancy during first trimester
included within constitutionally protected zone of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (zone of privacy extends to unmarried individual's choice of contraceptives); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (use of contraceptives by married couples falls within
a zone of privacy created by Bill of Rights). Commentators have criticized the Court's zone
of privacy theory. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 932 (1973) (attacking Roe Court for manufacturing constitutional rights
and usurping legislative functions); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 170 (criticizing Roe Court for usurping legistative
functions).
7. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (Court upheld Amish parents'
first and fourteenth amendment religious and due process freedoms and overturned criminal
statute mandating school attendence); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 391, 399, 400 (1923) (parent's
right to have children taught German protected under the liberty clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (statute imposing compulsory
public school attendance unconstitutional because it infringes on the "liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
The Court has also recognized some non-traditional family relationships under the theory
of equal protection. Statutes that discriminate against illegitimate children have been invalidated.
See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1975) (statute denying welfare
benefits to illegitimate children while granting them to similarly situated legitimate children
violates equal protection clause); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (upholding illegitimate
child's claim for recovery for mother's wrongful death). See generally Note, Mathews v. Lucas,
A Set Back in the Illegitimate's Quest for Equal Protection, 16 FAM. L.Q. 37 (1977) (discussion
of Court's treatment of illegitimates).
8. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (though a property right can be deter-
mined by a court without in personam jurisdiction over the holder of the right, a mother's
right to custody of her minor children is more than a property right and requires in personam
jurisdiction over the mother).
9. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
10. The state has a broad interest in preserving itself as a collective entity. The state will
intervene in the family structure when the parent's behavior threatens the state's interest in
maintaining the security of its social, political, or economic institutions. Note, State Intrusion
into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as State Intrusion]. For an explanation of these state interests, see Pound,
A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943). Depending on the circumstances,
these interests may or may not be compelling when viewed by courts. Child abuse and neglect
however, are always considered compelling and warrant state intervention. See infra note 11.
For an overview of state neglect laws, see generally Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect
Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
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upon the family structure:" police power and parens patriae. Pursuant to
its police power interest, a state has broad authority to act as the guardian
of its citizens.' 2 Closely linked with this police power interest is the state's
parens patriae interest in safeguarding the education, development, and emo-
tional well-being of its citizens.' 3 Pursuant to these powers, the state may
11. When parents either abuse or neglet a child, or make potentially life threatening deci-
sions which may seriously jeopardize a child's well-being, the state's interest is compelling and
justifies intervention into privacy of the family. The state's rationale is that children are par-
ticularly vulnerable and lack the ability to protect themselves. See Note, Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198-1248 (1980). For a general
discussion of the state's interests, see Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reap-
praisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Areen]; Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits
of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 894 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Parens Patriae].
12. The state may enact legislation to assure the health, safety, welfare, and morality of
its citizens under its police power interest. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 375 (1982). See also Boone v. Wyman, 295 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (state's
police power includes broad authority to regulate care of child when parents are unable to
provide proper support), aff'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1024 (1970).
13. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003
(rev. 5th ed. 1979). The doctrine has its origins in the eighteenth century English Court of
Chancery which recognized that the King had a duty to protect every subject who was in-
capable of self-protection. Infants and mental incompetents were included in this category.
See Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 24 P. Wms. 103, 118, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (Ch. 1725).
For an extensive discussion of parens patriae, see Areen, supra note 11, at 887; Custer, The
Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978); Thomas, Child Abuse
and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspective, 50 N.C. L. REV.
293 (1972); Parens Patriae, supra note 11, at 894-99. The Supreme Court has recognized parens
patriae in protecting children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (state
has a duty as parens patriae to protect minor children); Prince v. Massachussets, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (the state, acting as parens patriae, may regulate child labor and other mat-
ters). See also Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 106, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (1947) (right of
state as parens patriae to protect children against abuse by parent); Kantorovicz v. Ream, 332
S.W.2d 269, 270-71 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959) (statute permitting termination of neglectful parents'
rights to child recognized supremacy of guardianship of state over that of parents); In re William
L., 477 Pa. 322, 338-39, 383 A.2d 1228, 1235-37 (right of parents subjugated to parens patriae
power of state), cert. denied sub nom., Beatty v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 439
U.S. 880 (1978).
The Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) discredited many accepted notions
regarding the state's parens patriae interest in the juvenile system. Gault involved a fifteen
year old boy who had been placed in a detention home without written notice of the charges
against him or his right to counsel. The Court held that due process required procedural regularity
in state delinquency proceedings, notwithstanding the state's altruistic purposes of assisting and
redirecting the child. Id. at 17-18.
Subsequent to the Gault decision, lower courts began to criticize other aspects of state activity
based upon the parens patriae doctrine. Courts rejected the state's well-intentioned motives
and held that constitutional requirements circumscribed drastic state intervention. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (termination of parental rights for
child neglect); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazar, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974) (civil
commitment). See generally Keiter, Privacy, Children and Their Parents: Reflections on and
Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 498-500 (1982) (review of con-
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temporarily remove an abused or neglected child from the parental home
and impose criminal sanctions on the parents responsible for such
maltreatment." If subsequent to the temporary removal of a child from its
home the parents evidence little improvement and reconciliation is deemed
improbable,' 5 the state may attempt to secure a permanent removal of the
child from the parental home. 6 Specifically, alleging that the parents are unfit,"
stitutional underpinnings of the parental responsibility doctrine and basis for state legislative
authority over family matters).
In recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the state's parens patriae
interest. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 422 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) (parens patriae interest in helping
parents care for the mental health of children); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)
(state has parens patriae interest in caring for mentally disabled and protecting the community
from their dangerous tendencies). The Gault decision serves as a continuous reminder to the
states that although they have a legitimate parens patriae interest, constitutional limitations
define its scope.
14. Fraser, .4 Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse,
12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 119-22 (1974) (discussion of drawbacks of criminal prosecution
as an approach to the problem of child abuse). See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1000-14
(1975) (discussion of alternative views of the state's role in raising children) [hereinafter cited
as Wald].
15. States vary in their efforts to unite the family before initiating a termination proceeding.
See, e.g., In re Rosenbloom, 266 N.W.2d 888, (Minn. 1978) (per curiam) (failure of welfare
agency to make reasonable efforts to reunite family resulted in dismissal of initial termination
determination); In re Barron, 268 Minn. 48, 127 N.W.2d 702 (1964) (policy of statute requires
and welfare of child demands reasonable effort by social agencies to aid parent before termina-
tion); In re Leon R., 43 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.E.2d 374, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1979) (by discourag-
ing parents from visiting child, Department of Social Services did not meet its statutory burden
of demonstrating efforts to reunite the family). But see, e.g., In re Rose G., 57 Cal. App.
3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976) (social services not mandated in every case and absence
of social services alone is not a denial of due process); In re Susan M.,, 53 Cal. App. 3d 300,
125 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1956) (providing services is matter of judicial discretion, remanded for
consideration of whether services should have been offered).
16. To remove the child permanently from the home, the state must first terminate the
parental rights. Termination of the parental rights follows from several factual situations. A
termination occurs without the parent's consent at an adoption proceeding or a special hearing
prior to an adoption proceeding. A court also may order a termination at the dispositional
phase of a neglect proceeding held to determine the fitness of the parent or the best interest
of the child. Finally, termination may occur at a special fact-finding termination hearing. These
hearings are commonly held when the child has been in a foster home for a period of time
and the parent has failed to maintain contact with the child or plan for the child's future.
See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termina-
tion of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 633-36 (1976).
17. New Hampshire, for example, has estabLished four categories of parental unfitness which
justify the termination of parental rights. A termination petition will be granted by the probate
court if: a) the parents have abandoned the child; b) the parents have neglected to provide
the necessary care to the child; c) the parents have failed to correct conditions leading up to a
finding of neglect and the parents are and will continue to be incapable of giving the ap-
propriate care to the child. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-c:5 (1977 & Supp. 1981). See also
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b, 4(a)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (guardianship will be
awarded if: a) both parents are dead; b) parents abandoned child prior to petition for adop-
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the state can petition the family court to terminate permanently 8 the parental
rights and place the child in an alternate home. 9
In Santosky v. Kramer,20 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the fair preponderance of the evidence standard of proof was a sufficient
standard upon which a state could completely and irrevocably sever the
natural parents' rights to their children. The Santosky Court held that natural
parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody,
and management of their children, and that this interest must be accorded
fundamentally fair procedures. 2 ' Upon examination of a typical termination
proceeding, the Court determined that numerous factors exist which create
a significant probability of an erroneous termination of parental rights.22
Consequently, the Santosky Court rejected the fair preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof and held that due process requires the state to
support its allegations of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.23
After a brief review of procedural due process, the Court's due process
analysis in parental termination proceedings will be discussed. An examina-
tion of the constitutional underpinnings of procedural due process will reveal
the deficiencies inherent in the due process test applied by the Santosky Court.
tion; c) parents are unable to care for child because of mental illness or retardation; d) child
permanently neglected; or e) parents abused the child); VA. CODE §§ 16.1-283 (B)(1)-(2) (1982)
(parents' right can be terminated if the child's life was threatened by neglect or abuse and
it is unlikely that child can be returned to parents safely).
18. As one court succinctly stated:
Termination of parental rights, so called, severs permanently, not only the rights
and obligations of the parent relative to the child, but those of the child as well.
The child loses the right of support and maintenance, for which he may thereafter
be dependent upon society; the right to inherit and all other rights inherent in the
legal parent-child relationship, not just for the period during which he is subject
to the code, but forever.
In re K.S., 33 Colo. App. 72, 76, 515 P.2d 130, 132-33 (1973). Accord In re William L.,
477 Pa. 322, 370, 383 A.2d 1228, 1252 (Manderino, J., dissenting) (when parental rights are
terminated, the child is "dead" as far as the parents are concerned), cert. denied sub nom.
Beatty v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
19. Although the state's goal is to make adoption possible, adoption is neither a legally
necessary predicate nor a realistic expection of many children who become wards of the state.
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, 3(i) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (proof of likelihood that
child will be placed for adoption not required in determining whether best interests of child
are promoted by committing guardianship and custody of child to authorized agency). Cf. Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977) (few foster children achieve a
stable home life through final termination of parental ties and adoption into a new permanent
family). See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 49-52 (1979) (authors conclude that the law is a crude instrument and cannot be
utilized to create parental relationships) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN]; Mnookin, Foster Care-
In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 605-06 (1973) (long term foster care can
never replace nurturing advantage lost to the child from the break up of natural family and
may be harmful to needs of the child) [hereinafter cited as Mnookin].
20. __ U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
21. Id. at 1394.
22. Id. at 1398-1401. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 1402-03.
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Additionally, the practical effects of imposing a higher degree of proof on
termination statutes, termination procedures, and child protection agencies
will be explored.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
An analysis of procedural due process must begin with the fourteenth
amendment which commands that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." 2 ' The fundamental re-
quirements of procedural due process mandate that an individual be given
an opportunity to be heard2 5 at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner prior to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.26 These procedural
safeguards, which have evolved to include notice,27 the right to a hearing,2 "
and the right to present evidence,2 9 are derived from the theory that per-
sonal freedom can be preserved only when there is a check on arbitrary
governmental action.3"
Evaluating whether an individual is entitled to procedural due process pro-
tection involves an inquiry into whether a due process right is involved, and
if so, exactly what procedural safeguards are required. 3  The threshold in-
quiry begins with a determination of whether the personal interest asserted
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 384, 394 (1918) ("the fundamental requisite of due pro-
cess of law is the opportunity to be heard").
26. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). This principle requires that the reci-
pient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proceeding and an effective
opportunity to defend himself in the proceeding. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1970) (discussion of the elements of a fair hearing).
27. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (notice is an "elemen-
tary and fundamental requirement of due process").
28. Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (due process requires hearing before
prisoner loses good time credits). See generally Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to
Be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (1974) (discussion
of the importance in contemporary society of notice and hearing as procedural restraints).
29. American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932). The right to present evidence
is an issue of form over content. This inquiry centers on what procedures are necessary to
ensure a fair hearing. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1982)
(indigent parents in termination proceedings provided counsel on a case-by-case basis); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (decision-maker has discretion on whether to allow cross-
examination or presentation of witnesses); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no general
requirement of counsel in probation revocation hearings).
30. See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1975) (limitations on governmental power are necessary
even when legitimate governmental concerns exist).
31. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (Court first considered whether due
process requirement applied to parole revocation and then determined what procedural safeguards
should apply). See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (individual's due pro-
cess interest in not being unnecessarily confined in mental institution warranted a clear and
convincing standard of proof); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (clergyman's entitle-
ment interest in driver's license requires that he receive a hearing before revocation); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits are constitutionally protected statutory
19831
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falls within the protective ambit of the due process clause. The two major
judicial approaches utilized to examine whether due process protection is
warranted are the entitlement analysis and the core liberty analysis. 2
The entitlement analysis conditions due process protection upon the ex-
istence of an independently grounded legal right.33 Without this right, an
individual is not entitled to invoke the protection of the fourteenth
amendment."' An entitlement inquiry concentrates on the process that must
be followed to minimize unfair or mistaken deprivations of rights conferred
upon private individuals or groups by the government.35 As such, the analysis
focuses on the specific provisions of statutes, administrative rules, regula-
entitlement interest and cannot be severed without procedural safeguards against arbitrary
termination).
32. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-8 to 10-11, at 506-532 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as TRIBE].
33. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Statutory entitlement interests
are interests that arise from positive law or mutually explicit understandings. Entitlement in-
terests include employment contracts with the government, welfare benefits, and parole benefits.
This concept originated in the 1970's, when the rapid expansion of the public sector, along
with the government's assumption of responsibility for the poor, increased dependence upon
the government. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (extensive
discussion of the birth of statutory entitlement interests). The Court originally distinguished
between individual rights, stemming from constitutional or common law sources, and "privileges"
bestowed by the government. The privilege concept was limited somewhat by the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions." This doctrine held that the government may not condition the
receipt of a benefit upon the non-assertion of constitutional rights. See Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state cannot condition unemployment compensation benefits on the ac-
ceptance of Saturday work when it infringes on an individual's religious practices). The Court
has rejected this doctrine and now holds that entitlements are protected liberty and property
interests. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parole revocation must
be preceded by orderly process); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (since clergyman
was entitled to drivers license, he was entitled to a hearing concerning suspension of the license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitle-
ment and those who receive them are entitled to a hearing before they are terminated). For
a discussion of the Court's rejection of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, see Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1439, 1448 (1968).
34. There have been several cases in which the absence of a legally grounded right has
precluded application of the entitlement analysis. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
See generally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J.
89 (extensive discussion of the inconsistencies and illogical fallacies inherent in the present en-
titlement doctrine) [herinafter cited as Entitlement].
35. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 10-7, at 503. This instrumental approach views the purpose
of due process as an enforcement device. Instead of emphasizing the individual's rights, it stresses
procedural regularity. Its purpose is to assure accuracy by distributing various benefits in an
orderly manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976). The resolution of issues
involving the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures requires consideration of
three factors: (1) the private risk that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable values,
if any, of additional safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail. See infra notes
45-48 and accompanying text.
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tions, and mutual understandings between the government and the
individual.3 6
In contrast, a core liberty analysis3" focuses on the importance of an in-
dividual's right and the adverse impact that will result from infringement of
that right in a particular decisional context. This analysis is based on the
theory that substantive or core values exist which are so fundamental that
government infringement must be narrowly circumscribed and must only
occur to fulfill a compelling purpose. 8 Instead of focusing on the existence
of a legal entitlement, a court will scrutinize the effect of state action on
an individual's interest and determine whether due process procedural
safeguards are necessary to protect that interest." This approach embodies
36. See generally TRIBE, supra note 32, § 10-9, at 515. Individuals do not have a constitu-
tional right to receive statutory entitlements. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)
(once government offers right, it cannot withdraw that right without meeting the requirements
of due process).
37. The Court has defined core liberty interests as encompassing both procedural and substan-
tive protection. Core liberty interests include "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children [and to]
worship God according to the dictates of . . . conscience." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923). The Court has subsequently extended the definition of core liberty interests to in-
clude government actions which are devoid of fundamental fairness. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (despite lack of biological relationship and despite
state's role in creating foster parent relationship, foster families might have a fundamental
liberty interest sufficient to trigger procedural due process); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (procedures devoid of fundamental fairness offend due pro-
cess, thus, Attorney General's action of providing list of designated communist groups to Loyalty
Review Board for Board's use in determining employees' loyalty invalid).
38. Numerous rights have been declared core liberties. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right of interstate travel); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974)
(right of incarcerated persons to vote by absentee ballot); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right to bear children); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to pro-
cure abortion).
The Court traditionally applies a strict scrutiny analysis when addressing core liberties. The
theoretical underpinnings of strict scrunity rest on the recognition that state actions which burden
fundamental rights or connote prejudice against racial or other minorities should be subjected
to a heightened scrunity to preserve the substantive values of equality and liberty. TRIBE, supra
note 32, § 16-6, at 1000. Strict scrutiny has been called "strict in theory and usually fatal
in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
18 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Cary v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (regulations on
the right to make fundamental decisions regarding procreation may be justified by a compell-
ing state interest and must be narrowly drawn to effectuate that interest); Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (state regulation of family living arrangements must
be carefully examined by the court to determine legitimacy of the interest and extent that in-
terest is served by the regulation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (state statutes limiting
fundamental rights must be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to
minimize infringement of legitimate rights at stake); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (regulation of contraceptives struck down because it unnecessarily abridged pro-
tected freedoms).
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an intrinsic view of due process, stressing the individual's right to participate
in a judicial process in which the government seeks to abridge a protected
liberty interest.
40
Upon finding a constitutionally protected interest under either an entitle-
ment or core liberty analysis, the inquiry turns to a determination of the
appropriate level of procedural protection. The Supreme Court has stated
that due process is flexible and prescribes distinct procedures for each set
of circumstances. 4 ' Additionally, the Court has held that the objectives of
due process, minimizing error and reducing the possibility of arbitrary govern-
mental actions, can be achieved through varying procedures tailored to fit
the specific factual context.4 2
The Court typically has applied a balancing approach when determining
the appropriate level of process due. Prior to 1970, the Court employed an
intrinsic inquiry which focused primarily on the nature of the governmental
function and the private interest affected by the governmental action.4 3 During
the 1970's, however, the Court embarked on an intensive review of ad-
ministrative hearing procedures for constitutional violations." Dissatisfied
40. The intrinsic approach to due process emphasizes the individual's right to maintain his
dignity as a person. For a discussion of this approach, see generally Michelman, The Supreme
Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J.
1153, 1172-75. Granting individuals a hearing so that they may participate in governmental
decisions that affect them embodies the principle that the primary purpose of the due process
clause is the interchange between citizens and government. In essence, it is the right to be
consulted about what action is taken against an individual. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (right of welfare recipient to participate in process by which government
attempts to withdraw benefit). See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (confrontation aspects of adversarial system
serve as most effective means of protecting personal liberty).
The intrinsic approach has been criticized for involving judges in political matters which
allow them to make decisions based upon subjective preferences. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS MISSING (1970); Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL.
L. REV. 645 (1932); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431 (1930). Other commentators have challenged this criticism. See, e.g., Linde, Judges, Critics,
and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly
Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1971).
41. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
42. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972). See generally TRIBE, supra note 32,
§ 10-7, at 503.
43. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (court must determine the "precise nature
of the governmental function involved as well as private interest affected by the action") (quoting
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). See generally
Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of In-
terest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1537 (1975) (advocating abandonment of the interest
balancing doctrine in summary action in favor of an inquiry which focuses on the quality of
the treatment accorded an individual rather than the importance of asserted governmental in-
terests) [hereinafter cited as Interest Balancing].
44. For a discussion of this shift in the Court's focus, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CI. L. REV. 28 n.l (1967) [hereinafter cited as Mashawl.
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with the informal balancing test, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge5 created
an instrumental three-tiered due process formula. The Court stated:
[The] identification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the pro-
bable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. 6
Although the costs of procedural protections are not controlling, they are
given substantial weight in this formula. 7 This emphasis results from the
public's competing interest in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative
resources." Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that pro-
cedural due process is not designed to promote governmental efficiency,
'4 9
the Court noted that "at some point the benefit of an additional safeguard
45. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Eldridge, the Court upheld the Social Security Administration's
procedures for terminating social security benefits without an evidentiary hearing. The Eldridge
Court concluded that holding evidentiary hearings would entail fiscal and administrative burdens
vastly out of proportion to any countervailing benefits. Id. at 345. See Mashaw, supra note
44, at 44. Mashaw writes that Eldridge represents a turning point in the Court's resolution
of procedural due process issues. He points out that after Eldridge, plaintiffs have been uniformly
unsuccessful. Id. at 28 n.l. Interestingly, the Court has avoided a balancing analysis in recent
cases by finding due process inapplicable. Id.
46. 424 U.S. at 335.
47. Id. at 348. The Eldridge test has been attacked by several commentators. One scholar
criticizes the Eldridge test as conflicting with the primary purpose of the due process clause;
protecting individual interests from arbitrary governmental infringment. TRIBE, supra note 32,
§ 10-13, at 543. Tribe believes that the Eldridge test's focus on monetary factors renders it
incapable of measuring the values of dignity and self-respect. Id. Additionally, the test establishes
a presumption of constitutionality for procedural safeguards instituted by the government. Id.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (substantial weight must be given to good-
faith judgment of the administrators of the social welfare system that procedures provided
assure fair consideration of individuals' entitlement claims). The Court's unwillingness to con-
sider values other than obtaining accurate results coupled with the Court's strong presumption
of constitutionality to statutory procedural protections, has been described as "a serious ab-
dication ...of judicial responsibility under the due process clause." TRIBE, supra note 32,
§ 10-13, at 542-43. See also Mashaw, supra note 44, at 30 (the failure of the Eldridge test
lies in its emphasis on questions of technique rather than value).
48. 424 U.S. at 343. The Court noted that "experience with the constitutionalizing of govern-
ment procedures suggests that the ultimate additional costs in terms of money and administrative
burdens would not be insubstantial." Id. The Eldridge Court found it particularly important
that the increased costs of new administrative procedures would be paid by deserving recipients
of the social welfare program. Id. In short, the Court's rationale for concentrating on expense
purports to be a concern for the individual rights of others and not the costs of an additional
procedural safeguard in general.
49. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) (cost of protecting due process
rights do not justify its denial); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (procedural due pro-
cess is not designed to promote governmental efficiency).
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to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms
of increased assurance is outweighed by the cost.""0
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES IN TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
The Court has addressed procedural due process challenges involving state
termination of parental rights under both an intrinsic and an instrumental
procedural due process methodology. In Stanley v. Illinois," the Court de-
cided the threshold question of whether a hearing should be required to deter-
mine a parent's fitness before the state terminates the parent's right to his
child. The Stanley Court held that an unwed father could not be presumed
unfit without particularized proof. 2 Applying a two-pronged intrinisic test,
the Stanley Court balanced the nature of the governmental function involved
and the private interest at stake.53 The Court concluded that the parent's
substantial interest in raising his child outweighed the state's legitimate in-
terest in protecting the welfare of its minor children and, thus, a hearing
was constitutionally required.5" The Stanley Court emphasized that parental
interests "warrant deference and absent a countervailing interest,
protection." 5
Nine years later in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,5 6 the Court
50. 424 U.S. at 348.
51. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
52. Id. at 648. Under the Illinois statutory scheme examined in Stanley, a hearing and pro-
of of parental unfitness was required before the state could assume custody of the children
of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers. Children of unmarried fathers, however,
were declared dependents of the state when their mothers died and were taken from their unwed
fathers without a hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect. In Stanley, an unwed
father attacked this statutory scheme as violative of equal protection. The Court, constrained
by the pleadings, implied that the application of an irrebutable presumption to one classifica-
tion and not to another violated equal protection. The Stanley Court reasoned that because
Illinois recognizes that married fathers have a right to a hearing the equal protection clause
also requires that such protection be extended to unmarried fathers. Id. (Burger, CA., dissen-
ting). For a general discussion of irrebutable presumptions, see Comment, The Irrebutable
Presumptions Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
53. See 405 U.S. at 658. The Court applied the test followed in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1971)). Although noting that the state's interest in prompt efficacious procedures
is worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication, the Stanley Court held that the Con-
stutition recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. The Court emphasized that the
due process clause is designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
states' overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy. 405 U.S. at 656.
54. Id. at 658. The Court further noted that the state's interest in administrative efficiency
was insufficient to justify refusing an unwed father a hearing when the dismemberment of
his family was at issue. Id. at 658.
55. Id. at 651. Although the Court did not label the parental right fundamental, it did
recognize that it is an important right deserving constitutional protection. As a result, the Stanley
decision stands for the proposition that the due process clause requires states to protect the
interests of both parents and children by limiting its intrusion upon the family structure. See
Note, Termination of Parental Rights and the Lesser Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 12 TULSA
L.J. 528 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lesser Restrictive Alternative].
56. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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addressed whether an indigent parent should be provided counsel in a parental
termination proceeding. 7 The Lassiter Court abandoned the Stanley two-
pronged intrinsic test and adopted a structured instrumental test which
changed the thrust of its due process analysis in parental proceedings. In
determining whether due process required assistance of counsel, the Court
established the presumption that an indigent parent does not have the right
to appointed counsel unless faced with a deprivation of physical liberty. 8
The Lassiter Court balanced this presumption against the three factors enun-
ciated in Mathews v. Eldridge:" the interests of the parent; the interests
of the state; and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parents' in-
terest through the procedures used."0 Although the Court found that the
parents' interest was significant in Lassiter, this interest was outweighed by
the presumption against appointed counsel." Thus, the Lassiter Court con-
cluded that the decision to appoint counsel for indigent parents should be
made by the trial judge on an individualized basis.62 By adopting the Eldridge
test, the Lassiter Court shifted due process concerns from the intrinsic
analysis, which focused on how parental rights can be best protected, toward
an instrumental evaluation of the competing economic and fundamental in-
terests involved.
STANDARD OF PROOF
For a thorough understanding of the Santosky decision, the function of
the standard of proof sufficient to satisfy the due process clause must be
discussed. In every lawsuit, the factfinder must weigh the evidence presented
against a specific standard of proof. The standard of proof instructs the
factfinder on the gravity of the right involved and the degree of confidence
he must have in the correctness of his decision.63 Traditionally, the issues
57. Id. at 24-32.
58. Id. at 25-26. The Court stated that the defendant's interest in personal freedom trig-
gered the right to appointed counsel. The Court seemed unpersuaded by the fact that physical
liberty is at stake in termination proceedings. Id. That is, many termination proceedings have
quasi-criminal overtones and, in fact, are often predicated upon criminal activity such as child
neglect. See S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAnL 56-67 (1971) (in-depth discussion of child neglect
statutes).
59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
61. Id. at 31-33. The Court, using a case-by-case analysis, found that the Eldridge factors
would not always be distributed in a manner to overcome the presumption against the right
to appointed counsel. Thus, the standard established by Eldridge, enabling, a court to balance
the costs and benefits of a procedural safeguard, increases the possibility that the Court would
deny indigents the right to appointed counsel. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
argued that the Eldridge test is totally inappropropriate for cases involving physical liberty.
Id. Justice Stevens stated that such cases should be addressed in terms of fairness rather than
weighing the pecuniary costs to the state against the benefits to society. Id. at 60.
62. Id. at 32.
63. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1979) (explaining purpose and use of different standards of
proof). The standard of proof refers to the degree of certainty that the trier of fact must
1983]
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to be resolved, the potential consequences to the parties involved, and the
practical difficulties of proof determine the appropriate burden of proof. 6'
Three standards of proof have emerged: preponderance of the evidence,65
clear and convincing evidence,"' and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 67
In a civil suit, where the risk involved is commonly money damages, courts
apply the lower standard, preponderance of the evidence. 68 Under this stan-
dard, the risk of an erroneous determination is allocated equally between
the parties to the suit. This allocation is appropriate because the consequences
of an erroneous determination are not serious enough, inasmuch as they
do not involve the loss of liberty or life, to necessitate a higher standard
of proof. 69
In contrast to the civil standard of proof is the stringent standard im-
posed in a criminal proceeding. In criminal proceedings, the state attempts
to deprive an individual of liberty and/or life. Consequently, courts apply
the highest standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt." The application
have about the alleged facts in order to return a verdict. In contrast, the burden of proof
refers to the duty a party has to persuade the trier of fact that the allegations are true. 9
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485, 2493, 2497 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WGMORE]. See
also Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 1153,
1164 (1972) (explaining differences between burden of proof and burden of persuasion); McBaine,
Burden of Proof- Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 246-47 (1944) (because of human
malice, the factfinder can never be sure a fact is true; he can find only "what (a) probably
happened, or (b) what highly probably happened, or (c) what almost certainly has happened")
(emphasis in orginal).
64. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
65. The preponderance of the evidence standard has been defined as proof that an alleged
fact's "existence is more probable than its non-existence." Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 66 (1933). For further discussion
of this standard, see WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 2498.
66. Clear and convincing evidence has never been precisely defined. The standard falls
somewhere between the ordinary civil standard and the stringent criminal standard. See, e.g.,
Moran v. Estate of Pellegrine, 90 N.J. Super. 122, 125, 216 A.2d 406, 407 (App. Div. 1966)
("clear and convincing evidence" is stronger than mere preponderance, yet less certain than
"beyond a reasonable doubt"). For a discussion of this standard, see C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 340, at 796-97 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCOR-
MICK]; WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 2498, at 329.
67. Proof "beyond reasonable doubt" implies a greater reduced margin of error in human
judgment. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, § 341, at 798-99; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 2497,
at 317-18.
68. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970).
69. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
70. The Court traditionally has limited the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof
to criminal cases in which the liberty and reputation of the accused is threatened. See Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) ("reasonable
doubt" rule in criminal actions evolved from common law traditions of safeguarding against
unjust conviction). In Winship, the Court announced, for the first time, that the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof was constitutionally mandated. Recently, however, courts
have expanded the scope of this standard to cases involving involuntary commitment to mental
institutions and involuntary terminations of parental rights. See, e.g., In re Sonsteng, 175 Mont.
307, 314, 573 P.2d 1149, 1152 (1977) ("reasonable doubt" standard applies in commitment
proceedings); State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978) (parents
must be proved unfit beyond a reasonable doubt before parental rights can be terminated).
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of this standard reflects the belief that the entire risk of error should be
placed on government. This standard provides society with a reasonable
assurance that guilty persons are convicted and innocent persons remain free."
The third standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence, is applied
when the interest at stake is more important than money, but not as severe
as a total deprivation of liberty." Courts apply this standard where strong
policy considerations are involved and where the possiblity of deceit is greater
than in ordinary circumstances." For example, when the state attempts to
civilly commit a person to a mental institution, due process requires proof
by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill.74 This
standard strikes a fair balance between the interests of the individual and
those of the state.
75
THE SANTOSKY DECISION
John and Annie Santosky's three oldest children were temporarily removed
from their care in 1973 and 1974 because of incidents indicating parental
neglect. 6 Each child was adjudicated as neglected, and placed with the Ulster
County Department of Social Services for a period of eighteen months.7 7
71. For a discussion of the historical development of the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard, see May, Some Rules of Evidence, Reasonable Doubt in Civil anti Criminal Cases, 10
AM. L. REV. 642 (1876).
72. See, e.g., Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)
(deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization).
73. See, e.g., Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1218 (2d Cir. 1972) (clear and convinc-
ing evidence necessary to prove oral agreement to revoke mutual wills); Brown v. Buchanan,
419 F. Supp. 199, 201 (E.D. Va. 1975) (clear and convincing evidence required to prove or
establish a fraud in bankruptcy proceedings). See generally Comment, Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights: The Need for Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 771 (1980)
(advocating that courts apply a clear and convincing standard of proof in termination
proceedings) [hereinafter cited as Involuntary].
74. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
75. Id. at 430-431. The standard imposes a burden of proof on the state that is possible
to meet given the subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis, yet guards against the possibility
that the individual would be unnecessarily confined under a lower standard of proof. Id.
76. Santosky v. Kramer, - U.S. -, 102.S. Ct. 1388, 1393 (1982). Tina, the oldest child,
was removed from the parents' custody by court order in November, 1973 when she was two years
old. The Santoskys' second child, John, was removed from the home a year later because he was
suffering from malnutrition and had extensive bruises on his body. The third child, Jed, was
removed from the parents' custody when he was three days old as a result of the abusive
treatment suffered by the two older children. Id. at 1409-10 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Subsequent to the removal of the three older children, the Santoskys had two other children.
No action was taken to remove them from their parents' care. Id. at 1393 n.5. Under a New
York statute, temporary removal of a child may occur in two ways. The parents may consent
to the removal, or, as in the Santosky case, the family court can order the removal pursuant
to a finding that the child has been abused or neglected. N.Y. FnM. CT. ACT §§ 1021, 1022
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1976-1981).
77. 102 S. Ct. at 1393. A neglected child is one "whose physical, mental, or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of
the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT.
§ 1012 (f)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1981). After temporary removal, the children were placed
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Pursuant to New York law, a review was held at the end of this eighteen
month period, and the New York Family Court ordered the agency to re-
tain custody of the children.7" Additionally, the court directed the agency
to formulate a specific plan to reunite the family.79
In September of 1975, the Ulster County Department of Social Services
initiated proceedings to permanently terminate" the Santoskys' parental rights.
Under New York's statute, the family court must make a finding of perma-
nent neglect at a fact-finding hearing before termination at a subsequent
dispositional hearing is possible." Accordingly, the Department filed peti-
in a state agency's care. 102 S. Ct. at 1393. Temporary placement made pursuant to a finding
of neglect or abuse cannot be extended beyond 18 months without court review. N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 1055 (b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1981).
78. 102 S. Ct. at 1405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 392 (McKin-
ney 1976 & Supp. 1981-1982).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1409 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If the court orders the child to remain
in the authorized agency's care, it may order the agency to strengthen the parental relationship
by providing the parents with adequate housing, counseling, medical care, or psychiatric treat-
ment. These services will only be provided if they are in the best interest of the child. N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 392 (9) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
The plan devised by the Ulster County Department of Social Services included training by
a mother's aide, a nutritional aide, and a public health nurse, and counseling at a family plan-
ning clinic. In addition, the father received psychiatric treatment and vocational training and
the mother received counseling at a family service center. 102 S. Ct. at 1409 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Altogether, the state spent $15,000 in attempting to reunite the family between
1976 and 1979. Id. at 34.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 1393. Five grounds exist for the permanent termination of parental rights:
(1) both parents are deceased; (2) the child has been abandoned; (3) the parents by reason
of mental illness or retardation are unable to provide adequate care for the child; (4) the child
has been permanently neglected; (5) the child was severely or repeatedly abused by the parents
and the child has been in the care of an authorized agency for a period of one year prior
to the initiation of the proceeding. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, 4(a),(b),(c),(d) and (e) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1981-1982).
81. The permanent termination proceedings are bifurcated into two hearings. At a fact fin-
ding hearing the family court must find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the child
is permanently neglected. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, 3(f) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). A
permanently neglected child is defined as:
[A] child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian
has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such child came
into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly
to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically
and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts to en-
courage and strengthen the parental relationships when such efforts will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the child.
Id. § 384-b, 7(a). Upon a finding of permanent neglect, a dispositional hearing is held to deter-
mine what course of action would be in the best interests of the child. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT.
§ 625(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1982). The court does not presume that any particular disposition
will be in the child's best interests. Id. § 631. The court may dismiss the petition, suspend
judgment and retain jurisdiction for one year, or terminate the parent's guardianship and custody
of the child. Id. For a general discussion on termination of parental rights in New York, see
Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The
New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 216 (1971) (hereinafter cited as
Gordon].
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tions alleging permanent neglect,82 claiming that the parents had failed to
plan for the future of their children. The family court conducted a fact-
finding hearing on the matter and dismissed the petition. Applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, the court held that there
were insufficient grounds to terminate the Santoskys' parental rights. 3
In October of 1978, the Department of Social Services filed a second set of
petitions to terminate the Santoskys' parental rights.8 When the fact-find-
ing hearing commenced, the Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of
section 622 of the Family Court Act which permitted a finding of perma-
nent neglect upon proof supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 5
The family court rejected this constitutional challenge and found that the
Santoskys had neglected to plan for the future of their children,86 and that
the care they had provided for their children was, at best, "superficial and
devoid of any emotional contact."81 7 In accordance with the New York statute,
the court held that the parents' actions constituted permanent neglect. 8 At
a subsequent dispositional hearing, the family court terminated the Santoskys'
parental rights to their three children. 9
Holding
To determine whether due process requires a standard of proof greater
than a preponderance of the evidence in parental termination proceedings,
the majority pursued the traditional two-tiered due process inquiry: whether
the interest involved was deserving of due process protection, and if so, what
safeguards the level of process due required.9" First, the Court held that
the fourteenth amendment protects the parents' fundamental liberty interest
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1393. Pursuant to statute, the termination petition must allege that despite
the state agency's diligent efforts, the parents failed to maintain contact with their children
or failed to plan for the future of their children. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, 7(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1981-1982).
83. In re Santosky, 89 Misc. 2d 730, 393 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1977). The family court held that,
although the Santoskys' reactions to the state's efforts were generally "non-responsive and even
resentful, the fact that their response was at least superficially cooperative showed that there
was hope of future improvement and an eventual reuniting of the family." Id. at 738, 393
N.Y.S.2d at 492.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 1393.
85. Id.
86. Planning is defined as taking "such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate
stable home . . .within a period .. .which is reasonable under the financial circumstances
available to the parent." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, 7(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). "The
plan must be realistic and feasible, and a good faith effort shall not, of itself, be determinative."
Id. Maintaining contact will not preclude a court from terminating parental rights. Id. § 384-b,
7(b). Thus, if a visit or communication by a parent with the child demonstrates a lack of
affection and concerned parenthood, the action may be disregarded as insubstantial. Id.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 1393.
88. Id.
89. Id. Once the parental rights were terminated, the children faced the possibility of adoption.
90. Id. at 1388, 1394. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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in matters of family life.9 Indeed, persons confronted with forced dissolu-
tion of parental rights have a critical need for fundamentally fair procedures
to prevent the irretrievable destruction of family life. 2 As a result, the Court
concluded due process protection must be accorded.93
The Court then turned to the second inquiry, the nature of due process
protection required in a termination proceeding. The Court recognized that
the standard of proof adopted reflects the weight of the private and public
interest affected, as well as a societal judgment on the proper distribution
of risk between litigants.94 Rejecting the state's contention that individual
states should determine the standard of proof to be applied under a state
termination statute, the Court held that the minimum requirements of due
process are a matter of federal law and should be left to the federal judiciary
to resolve." The Court renounced the case-by-case procedural due process
analysis previously applied in termination proceedings and stated that the
appropriate level of due process would be determined by reference to the
typical parental termination proceeding, not the specific circumstances of
a particular case. 96
Thus, the Santosky Court adopted the three-tiered due process test of
Mathews v. Eldridge.9" The first tier of the Eldridge test, the private interest
affected, balanced in favor of the parents. 8 The parents' fundamental in-
terest in retaining custody of their children was not only infringed upon by
the state, but was completely severed. The Court also stressed the fact that
termination is final and irreversible. Rejecting the possibility that a child
may have an interest adverse to the parents, the Court maintained that, until
a finding of permanent neglect is made, the child possesses the same vital
interests as the parent in maintaining the family relationship.99 Accordingly,
91. Id. at 1394.
92. Id. See infra note 140.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1396 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (commitment
proceeding)).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 1395.
96. Id. at 1396. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981), the
Court applied a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the indigent parents had the right
to court-appointed counsel in termination proceedings. The Santosky Court rejected this ap-
proach and stated that the standard of proof must be known in advance and not determined
by the trial court subject to appellate review. 102 S. Ct. at 1396. See supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
97. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1396.
99. Id. at 1397-98. The Court stated that a finding of parental unfitness should not be
determined by balancing the child's interest in a normal family home against the parent's in-
terest in raising the child. Id. Pursuant to the New York termination statute, the fact-finder
only should be concerned with whether the state made diligent efforts to reunite the family
and whether the parents maintained contact with or planned for the future of their children.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614 1(c), (d) (McKinney 1975). Consequently, a court may only consider
the parent-child relationship to be adversarial after the state has established parental unfitness.
102 S. Ct. at 1398.
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the Court concluded that the risk to the parents-a finding of permanent
neglect which would authorize subsequent termination of the parental
rights-requires heightened procedural protections. ' "
The Court then addressed the second tier of the Eldridge test: whether
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest affected would
be increased by applying the fair preponderance of the evidence standard.
The Court noted that a fact-finding hearing bears many of the indicia of
a criminal trial.'' The Court cited numerous factors which magnify the risk
of an erroneous determination. For example, the termination proceedings
employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determination open to the
subjective values of the judge. Additionally, the parents involved are often
poor, uneducated, and classified as a minority. The state, on the other hand,
has more expertise and financial resources to prepare its case and the power
to shape the historical events that form the basis of the termination." 2 Finally,
the Court pointed out that parents have no double jeopardy defense against
continued state efforts to terminate parental rights of their children. "03 Con-
sequently, the preponderance of the evidence standard, the Court concluded,
is deficient because it distributes the risk of error equally between the parent
and the state in a proceeding that potentially may deny a fundamental liber-
ty interest to the parents. ' 4
Evaluating the last concern in the Eldridge analysis, the Court declared
that the state's interest in reducing the cost and burden of termination pro-
ceedings, and its parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the
welfare of its minor citizens, could adequately be served by applying a higher
degree of proof. '5 The Court stressed that the state's primary interest is
the continuation of the family relationship.' 06 Its secondary goal of providing
100. 102 S. Ct. at 1398.
101. Id. A termination proceeding has an accusatory and punitive focus. Alleging that the
parents are unfit, the state petitions the court to permanently sever the parental rights. For
an extensive discussion of termination procedures, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv.,
452 U.S. 18, 42-43 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. 102 S. Ct. at 1399. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 1400. In the Santosky case, the state's first attempt to terminate the parental
rights was unsuccessful. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 1400-01. The Court stated that using a fair preponderance of the evidence
standard reflects an incorrect judgment that society is essentially neutral toward the erroneous
termination of parental rights and the erroneous failure to terminate those rights. Id.
105. Id. at 1401. Unlike a constitutional mandate requiring a hearing or court-appointed
counsel, a stricter burden of proof does not impose substantial burdens, on the state. Id. See
Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (balancing presumption against
counsel with the three Eldridge factors results in a findng that parents do not have right to
counsel in every termination proceeding). The Court also noted that a higher degree of proof
would not create any new administrative burdens since New York already required the clear
and convincing standard of proof in matters of less importance, such as revocation of a drivers
license. 102 S. Ct. at 1401-02.
106. 102 S. Ct. at 1401. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, l(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp.
1981-1982).
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a child with a permanent alternate home arises only when the natural parent
cannot or will not provide an adequate family home.
Accordingly, the Court found that the near equal allocation of risk in-
herent in the fair preponderance of the evidence standard violated the four-
teenth amendment in parental termination proceedings. 1 7 The Court declined,
however, to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence
relied on at termination procedures is difficult to prove to a level of ab-
solute certainty and because state statutes prescribe different substantive stan-
dards for evaluating parental unfitness.' 8 The Court thus concluded that,
at a minimum, a clear and convincing standard of proof is required in a
parental termination proceeding.' 9 The decision of whether a higher stan-
dard of proof should be required is left to the discretion of the states.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has consistently held that parents have a fundamental
right or liberty interest in freedom of choice concerning family life' and
has narrowly limited the extent to which the state may intrude upon that
protected interest.' Nevertheless, the Santosky Court applied the Eldridge
due process formula and greatly infringed upon this protected interest of
107. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
108. Id. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion of those
state standards, see generally Katz, supra note 10; Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standards
for the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 530 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Ketcham]. These standards require the fact finder to evaluate to an absolute certainty-
such factors as lack of parental motive, absence of affection, and failure of parental foresight
and progress. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 1402-03. Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice
O'Connor dissented. The dissent criticized the majority for establishing the standard of proof
as a matter of federal constitutional law. Id. at 1404 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting
Justices predicted that the Court would inevitably be forced to address other aspects of ter-
mination proceedings, thereby inviting further federal court intervention into family law ques-
tions and, ultimately, the federalization of family law. Id. at 1404. The dissenters also disagreed
with the majority's conclusion regarding the nature of process due to a parent in a termination
proceeding. They maintained that the majority should have assessed the cumulative effect of
the procedural protections offered by the New York Family Court Statute. Id. at 1405. Accord-
ingly, after a thorough examination of the statute, the dissenters found it to be a praiseworthy
attempt to "aid" parents in regaining the custody of their children. Id. at 1414. Finally, the
dissent argued that the statute struck the proper balance between the interests of the parents
in maintaining custody of their children and the interest of the state in providing a stable,
nurturing homelife for its children. Id. at 1412-13. Consequently, the dissenters concluded that
a fair preponderance of the evidence was the appropriate standard of proof in a parental ter-
mination proceeding. Id. at 1414.
110. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
11l. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (right of privacy is not absolute and
is subject to some limitations because at some point state's interest in protection of health,
medical standards, and prenatal life outweigh interest of individual); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1973) (state's interest in universal education, however highly ranked, is not totally
free from a balancing process when it infringes on other fundamental rights and interests).
See also supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
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parents. By utilizing the Eldridge analysis, the Santosky decision may result
in a serious impairment of parents' fundamental interest in bringing up their
children.' I2
In essence, the Santosky Court employed a social calculus analysis, balan-
cing the parents' liberty interest, the probability that a higher standard of
proof would better protect that interest, and the state's additional ad-
ministrative expense in granting alternate procedures."' The Santosky Court,
admittedly, gave only a cursory analysis to the state's administrative and
fiscal interest. 1 ' The mere consideration of this interest, however, increases
the possibility that the parents' protected interest may be subjugated to a
state's concern in avoiding increased administrative and fiscal costs. More
importantly, the Court's concern with fiscal resource allocation has minimized
the constitutional importance of the parents' fundamental liberty interest.
A comparison of the Eldridge and Santosky decisions demonstrates that
the Eldridge due process formula is inappropriate in an inquiry concerning
parents' fundamental interests. In Eldridge, the Court created the three-tiered
balancing test to determine the threshold question of whether a hearing should
be granted before termination of disability benefits.' 5 The Court focused
on an entitlement interest, an independently grounded legal right found in
the Social Security Act." 6
In contrast to Eldridge, the Santosky Court considered whether the parents
received the necessary procedural safeguards to ensure a fair hearing. The
Santosky Court analyzed a core liberty interest and looked to the explicit
and implicit guarantees of the United States Constitution. ' 7 Specifically, the
issue was whether the fair preponderance of the evidence standard of proof
adequately protects parental rights when the state initiates an action to com-
112. The Court, in effect, applied a test that limited the parent's constitutional due process
right in order to economize and streamline administration of parental termination proceedings.
Ultimately, the degree of protection that will be given to a parental right will vary in direct
proportion to the fiscal and administrative costs involved. Thus, the parent's right to constitu-
tional protection is sacrificed in favor of administrative efficiency. See ge,'erally Saphire, Specify-
ing Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protections, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978) (Court has failed to specify due process values and, essentially,
has drained due process of its basic function as a limitation on the exercise of governmental
power).
113. See generally Mashaw, supra note 44, at 48-49. Mashaw criticizes this social calculus
analysis because it "dwarf(s) soft variables" and "ignore(s) complexities and ambiguities." Id.
at 48. The author asserts that the Court is incapable of finding an optimum social utility equa-
tion and that the decision should be left to the superior competence of the legislature. Id.
Other commentators have demanded that the Court apply a test that is more responsive to
procedural protections. See generally Interest Balancing, supra note 43, at 1538 (suggesting
an alternative to Court's interest-balancing approach which would focus inquiry on whether
procedures state accords an individual adequately achieve the basic purpose of due process).
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976).
116. Id.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
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pletely and irrevocably terminate those rights." 8 The Santosky Court found
that under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, parents possess
a protected liberty interest deserving strict procedural safeguards in termina-
tion procedures. ' 9 Instead of directing its inquiry to how the parents' con-
stitutionally assured liberty interest could best be protected, however, the
Santosky Court directed its inquiry to how both the state's and the parents'
interests could best be satisfied. Under this analysis, state fiscal and ad-
ministrative concerns may be viewed as outweighing the parents' protected
interest in the upbringing of children.
In short, the Eldridge test insufficiently protects the parents' fundamental
liberty interest because it embodies the view that the purpose of procedural
protections is to enhance efficiency and minimize cost.'20 The Supreme Court
should de-emphasize the routine utilitarian consideration of the Eldridge test
and direct its analysis toward the parents' intrinsic need for procedural
protections.' 2 By applying an analysis which moves closer to an intrinsic
conception of due process, the Court will reaffirm its historical recognition
that parents have a constitutionally assured liberty interest in matters of family
life.
IMPACT OF THE SANTOSKY DECISION
Although the Santosky Court improperly adopted the Eldridge test, the
outcome of the decision is commendable. The decision will have a signifi-
cant impact on termination statutes,' 2 2 termination proceedings, and child
protective agencies.
118. The purpose of the Eldridge due process test is to ensure an equal distribution of limited
statutory entitlement interests. This test is inappropriate in the context of Santosky where the
state is initiating a procedure to sever a biological relationship, recognized by the Constitution,
in a manner that is punitive and adversarial. See supra notes 58 & 101.
119. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
120. See TRIBE, supra note 32, § 10-13 at 543. It is essentially a utilitarian analysis that
balances the individual's right to procedural protection against a majoritarian benefit analysis.
See Interest Balancing, supra note 43, at 1533.
121. When the Court addresses a fundamental right it applies a rigorous strict scrutiny analysis.
Under a strict scrutiny approach, state laws impinging on fundamental rights must be justified
by a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to effectuate that legitimate compelling in-
terest. For cases applying a strict scrutiny analysis, see supra note 38. If the Court were to
adopt the intrinsic, strict scrutiny approach, the possibility that the parent's interest in preser-
vation of their family unit being outweighed by the state's interest in avoiding fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens would be eliminated. Furthermore, application of this test would be con-
sistent with the Court's prior decisions which have invalidated statutes infringing on fundamen-
tal interests.
122. Fourteen states have already adopted the "clear and convincing evidence" standard or
its equivalent by statute. Sixteen states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands re-
quire the "clear and convincing evidence" or its equivalent in case law. Santosky v. Kramer,
102 S. Ct. 1388, 1392 n.3 (1982). Three states have barred parental rights termination unless
the key allegations have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Angelia M.P., 106
Cal. App. 3d 42, 56-67, 164 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (1980), aff'd, 28 Cal. 3d 908, 171 Cal. Rptr.
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After Santosky, legislators and courts will be forced to scrutinize closely
termination statutes to ascertain whether preservation of the parent-child
relationship'23 is sufficiently recognized. The protection of the child's welfare
is the primary purpose of most termination statutes.'24 In attempting to pro-
tect the child's interest, some courts in termination proceedings do not focus
on parental unfitness, but rather, focus on whether the foster parents are
fulfilling the needs of the child;23 Other courts strike a balance between
the child's interests and the parents' interest in avoiding termination.'26 The
Santosky Court, however, established that the parents' and child's interests
diverge only after the parents are declared unfit.' 27 Thus, the decision will
637, 623 P.2d 198 (1981); State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1603A (West Supp. 1982).
123. See supra note 15.
124. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 232.5 (West 1982) ("this chapter shall be liberally con-
strued to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the right"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1113 (Supp. 1980) ("[tlhis Chapter is designated to achieve without undue delay the para-
mount objective of the best interest of the child, and all questions of interpretation shall be
resolved with that objective in mind"); FLA. STAT. § 39.9(2) (1978) (court may order termina-
tion if best interests and welfare of child require this result). It is submitted that addressing
the child's best interests is an essential inquiry. The courts fail in this inquiry, however, when
they treat the rights as adversarial and do not consider the possibility that the best interests
of the child might be with the parents. See, e.g., In re N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134, 139-40 (S.D.
1978) (conflict is inherent between the rights of the parents and those of the children). Conse-
quently, under the "best interest" test the dispute is confined to "a simple factual issue as
to which [party affords] the better surroundings or as to which party is better equipped to raise
the child." People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 469, 113 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1953)
(quoting People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952)).
125. Many courts rely on the psychological attachment theory discussed in GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 19. The authors believe that a child's understanding of time is unnatural and long term
separation from parents produces detrimental psychological effects. Id. at 11-12. They main-
tain that if a child develops a psychological parent-wanted relationship with a foster family,
the child should stay with the foster parent. Id. at 13-14, 19. The authors state that a child
needs continuity in relations and when this does not occur serious psychological harm results.
Thus, the authors conclude that placement decisions should be based on the least detrimental
alternative available. Id. at 53-56. The primary goal is to place children with parents who will
become the child's psychological parents. Therefore, termination proceedings would concen-
trate on whether the child's needs are being met by a new psychological parent. Id. at 106.
See, e.g., In re Raymond, 81 Misc. 2d 70, 77, 364 N.Y.S.2d 321, 328 (Fam. Ct. 1975) (court
will consider psychological attachment theory when determining permanent neglect); In re Kegal
85 Wis. 2d 574, 584, 587-88, 271 N.W.2d 114, 119 (1978) (termination affirmed on continuity
of relationship theory). Commentators have criticized this theory because existing psychiatric
and psychological knowledge is generally insufficient to make a custody determination between
two individuals having the same attachment to the child. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 19,
at 605.
126. See, e.g., State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971) (upholding statutory
provisions against vagueness attack because they properly balance the child's and the parent's
interests). See also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (intent of
legislature to balance both the natural parents' right and the child's right to a nuturing parent-
child relationship). See generally Gordon, supra note 81, at 263 (advocating that the natural rights
of the parents be weighed with the childrens' right to a warm supportive permanent home).
127. 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (1982).
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serve as precedent to invalidate statutes that construe the parent-child rela-
tionship as an adversarial one. Moreover, after Santosky, courts will no longer
consider the child's best interests separately in a termination proceeding.
Rather, they will focus solely on whether the state adequately has proved
parental unfitness, 2 ' and in doing so, should decrease the number of un-
necessary terminations.
By imposing the clear and convincing standard of proof, Santosky will
provide an impetus for the judicial system to uphold the goal of maintain-
ing the family unit. '29 Each state has various grounds for terminating paren-
tal rights.'30 The majority of these statutes are vague and provide little mean-
ingful guidance to judges.' 3 ' Consequently, the possibility of an erroneous
termination is high, because judges often are forced to rely on their subjec-
tive beliefs and experiences to ascertain if termination is necessary.' 32 The
Santosky decision will correct the inadequacies of these statutes by requiring
judges to possess a higher degree of confidence in the accuracy of their deci-
sions before terminating parental rights.
128. See infra note 130.
129. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.020 (West Supp. 1982) ("[tlhe legislature
declares that the family unit is a fundamental resource of American life which should be
nurtured").
130. Although some statutes properly consider parental culpability, intent, and refusal to
perform duties following an adjudication of dependency as grounds for termination, the statutes
generally give little concrete guidance. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1570(l)(a) (Law. Co-
op. 1981) (grounds for termination include failure to make effort to provide stable home, to
show concern for the child's welfare, or to achieve personal rehabilitation); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 4840(2)(b) (West 1979) (repeated refusal to give child necessary parental care for prolonged
periods of time is grounds for termination). For a discussion of various child protective statutes,
see generally Katz, supra note 10,. at 48-49, 66-68; Involuntary, supra note 73, at 779-82 (1980);
Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal
and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEo. L.J. 213, 231-32, nn.146-50 (1979).
There is a general feeling that more definite or specific statutes would not protect the welfare
of the child. See In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977); In re Ladewig, 34
Ill. App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1st Dist. 1975). In fact, some courts maintain that the general
standards used in the statutes are essential for protecting the child's interest. See, e.g., State v.
McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 297-99, 486 P.2d 567, 570 (1971) (statute permitting termination of
parental rights if parent is "unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental"
is not unconstitutionally vague because broad language is needed to protect the child). This
approach has been critized, however, and many proposals have been offered which contain
specific standards for termination of parental rights. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981); Katz,
Freeing Children for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 203 (1978).
131. Statutory standards which are not specific invite judges to apply their own folk psychology
in state intervention decisions. Wald, supra note 13, at 1001-03. This permits judges to impose
their own ideas of adult behavior, social depravity, and morality. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS
FAIL 59 (1971).
132. In one study, three experienced juvenile court judges were given files concerning 50
actual families and asked if the parental rights should be terminated. The judges agreed in
less than half of the cases. In those decisions they did agree on, the judges did not identify
the same factors as determinants. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 619.
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Finally, the imposition of a higher degree of proof will yield a positive
effect throughout a state's intervention system. Many states do not require
child protection agencies to make firm efforts to preserve the family unit
by providing rehabilitative and home-care services.' 33 Other states allow child
protection agencies to make only half-hearted attempts to rehabilitate the
family."' Consequently, children often are subjected to an endless parade
of foster homes,"' or worse, an ill-advised termination of parental rights.
When a state relinquishes its goal of preserving the family relationship, the
unwarranted disintegration of families results. The termination of parental
rights causes the child to be put up for adoption. This, in turn, provides
an alternative home for the parentless child and, thereby, relieves the state
of its obligation to provide foster care and bear the resultant administrative
costs.' 36 A higher standard of proof will remedy this result by compelling
state agencies to provide increased rehabilitative services. The Santosky deci-
sion, by mandating that clear and convincing evidence exist to terminate
parental rights,'3 7 has rendered it significantly more difficult for the state
to permanently remove a child from his natural home.'38 Because the ter-
mination of parental rights is now less feasible, and returning a child to
133. See supra note 15.
134. See, e.g., In re Rose G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 422, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 348 (1976)
(social services not mandated in every case and absence of social services alone not denial of
due process); In re Susan Lyn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 311, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714 (1975)
(provision of child protective services is matter of judicial discretion).
135. The longer a child remains in foster care, the less likely are his chances of returning
home or being adopted. See A. GRUBEL, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHsErrs, 72 (1973) (60%
of children in foster care had been in such care between four to eight years with average stay
over five years). This problem occurs because courts frequently consider the length of time
that the parent and child have been separated as grounds for leaving the child in the custody
of a state agency. Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd per curiam,
545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Other reasons have been cited for the child's extended stay
in foster homes. For example, agencies fail to offer rehabilitative services to the parents~to prepare
them for the return of their children. Additionally, states employ a limited number of social
service workers who are poorly paid, inadequately trained, and possess inherent cultural biases
toward minorities and the poor. For a more detailed discussion of the inadequacies of the
foster care system see Ketcham, supra note 108, at 540-43; State Intrusion, supra note 10, at 1386.
136. State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. v. Wade, 19 Or. App. 314, 322-23, 527 P.2d 753, 757 (1974).
Termination of parental rights helps to satisfy the high demand to adopt children. It also relieves
the state from the financial burden of providing institutional and foster care or public services
that may be necessary to reinforce or rehabilitate the child's natural family. Genden, Separate
Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial
Proceedings, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 575-77 (1976). See also Areen, supra note 11,
at 893-94.
137. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
138. Statutes require courts to make an adjudiction of dependency before removing the child
from the home. Dependency encompasses a finding of neglect, abuse, or abandonment. Most
state statutes require proof by a preponderance of evidence to justify a finding of dependency.
See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-3-106(6)(a) (1973) (dependency adjudication based on
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a harmful parental home is inadvisable, a state's alternative will be to either
direct its efforts toward rehabilitating the family or bear the high ad-
ministrative costs of providing foster care. Considering the economic hard-
ship that states are experiencing, it is likely that most states will choose to
work toward preserving the family unit. If indeed this is the case, future
termination of parental rights will occur only after the state has made diligent,
yet unsuccessful efforts to remedy the deficient home environment, and the
state has clearly proved statutory allegations of parental unfitness.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of a higher standard of proof in parental termination pro-
ceedings prevents the unnecessary destruction of parent-child relationships. The
state, constrained by a higher standard of proof, will have to work first toward
rehabilitating the family and may only initiate actions to terminate parental rights
after the parents clearly prove irredeemable. The Santosky decision impresses
upon the state intervention system that the primary goal of society is to preserve
parent-child relationships, not to terminate them.
Although the Santosky conclusion is commendable, the Court's due process
methodology may prove problematic. The Eldridge utilitarian due process for-
mula poses a serious threat to the parents' constitutionally assured liberty in-
terest. By balancing the parents' protected interest against the state's ad-
ministrative and fiscal interests, the Court minimizes the value of parental rights.
Indeed, it is difficult to accept the Eldridge proposition that the concepts of
individual rights and public costs are susceptible to principled comparisons. I"
Furthermore, the Court has noted that the interest of a parent in the care,
custody, and management of his child "comes to the Court with a momentum
of respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements.""'° Parental rights should be infringed upon
only when there is a substantial threat to the child's well-being, not because
a consensual view of convenience and cost exists.'' A less positivistic
methodology of procedural due process is needed in parental termimation pro-
ceedings. Accordingly, the Court should renounce the Eldridge three-tier
balancing test and adopt a test which focuses on protecting the parents' funda-
mental liberty interest in bringing up their children.
Ruth Slayco Witt
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